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NOTES
Illegalizing the NCAA's Eligibility Rules:
Did Cureton v. NCAA Go Too Far, or Not Far Enough?
I. Introduction
For almost thirty-five years, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
has imposed academic eligibility requirements on incoming college freshmen who seek
to participate in intercollegiate athletic competition.' These requirements represent the
NCAA's continuing efforts at maintaining the delicate balance between athletics and
academics at American colleges and universities.
However, it was not until 1986, with the implementation of an eligibility regime
known as "Proposition 48," that the NCAA rules attracted national attention. In fact,
Proposition 48 sparked a firestorm of controversy by reinstating - after a thirteen year
hiatus - a minimum standardized test score requirement into the NCAA's eligibility
equation. This test score element, which employed both the Scholastic Assessment Test
(SAT) and the American College Test (ACT) as its measuring criteria, was added to the
already existing minimum high school grade point average (GPA) requirement. Under
Proposition 48, then, a high school athlete was required to attain both a minimum GPA
and a minimum standardized test score to be eligible to compete in intercollegiate ath-
letics.3
Of the two prerequisites, the test score requirement proved to be the more occlusive,
and not surprisingly, the apex of the eligibility rules conflict. The controversy centered
on whether this standardized test score requirement resulted in unequal treatment for, or
had a disproportionately harsh impact on, African-American student-athletes.
Recently, in Tai Kwan Cureton, et al. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,4 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania became the first
judicial forum to consider the debate. On January 8, 1997, two African-American stu-
dent-athletes filed a putative class action alleging unlawful discrimination under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI) through the operation of the NCAA's initial
eligibility rules.5 Sitting for the court, Judge Buckwalter, in an unprecedented opinion,
stretched the interpretive limits of Title VI and permanently enjoined the NCAA from
implementing and operating its initial eligibility requirements.
This decision is the focus of this Note. Part II introduces the NCAA, examines its
eligibility requirements, and frames the concomitant controversy leading up to the Cu-
reton decision. Part HI analyzes the court's attempt at placing the action within the
1. See KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, AGENTS OF OPPORTUNITY 59 (1990).
2. Proposition 48 became NCAA Bylaw 5-1-j) and is now contained in NCAA Bylaw article 14.3. See
NCAA, NCAA RESEARCH REPORT, REPORT 92-02 at 5 (Martin T. Benson ed., Aug. 1993).
3. See NCAA OPERATING BYLAWS arts. 14.3.1.1(a) & (b), reprinted in NCAA, 1993-94 NCAA MANUAL
(Laura E. Bollig ed., 1993).
4. Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 37 F.Supp.2d 687 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
5. Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. Civ.A.97-131, 1998 WL 961387, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 13, 1998).
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statutory and jurisprudential confines of Title VI. First, it details the provisions of Title
VI and highlights the Supreme Court caselaw necessary to understanding their opera-
tion. Second, it scrutinizes the court's endorsement of a private right of action under
Title VI. Part III concludes by evaluating the court's determination that the NCAA is a
"program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance," and thus, subject to suit
under Title VI. Part IV reviews the merits of the Cureton decision by wading through
the court's three-pronged Title VI analysis. Finally, Part V departs from the normative
analysis of Parts H through IV and argues that the Cureton court unnecessarily limited
the scope of its ruling, thereby falling short of eliminating the discriminatory effects of
the NCAA's eligibility rules.
II. The NCAA and its Eligibility Rules: A Continuing Controversy
A. The NCAA
The NCAA serves as the rule-making body authorized with overseeing our nation's
intercollegiate athletic programs.6 The NCAA is a private, voluntary, unincorporated
association of approximately 1,200 member institutions, consisting of four-year colleges
and universities located across the United States.7 The NCAA membership is divided,
for purposes of bylaw legislation and intercollegiate competition, into Divisions I, II,
and 111.8 Its principal functions include establishing requirements concerning scholar-
ships, recruiting, and academic eligibility. By joining the NCAA, each member agrees to
abide by the NCAA's rules and policies as embodied in its bylaws.
9
The primary goal of the NCAA, as reflected in its Constitution, 10 is to protect the
integrity of intercollegiate sports through maintaining an acceptable level of education
for student-athletes and by promoting the concept of amateurism.'
B. The NCAA's Eligibility Rules
Since 1965, minimum initial eligibility rules have been at the forefront of the
NCAA's mission.' 2 The NCAA Constitution provides that these rules are "designed to
6. See Cureton, 37 F.Supp.2d at 696 ("Plaintiffs have established on this record that the member colleges
and universities have granted to the NCAA the authority to promulgate rules affecting intercollegiate
athletics...").
7. See id. at 690.
8. See id. Cureton deals with the promulgation of a bylaw affecting eligibility only in Division I, or what
is commonly understood as "big-time" intercollegiate athletics.
9. See id. at 695 (citing NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 183 (1988)).
10. Article 2.4 of the NCAA Constitution provides: "Intercollegiate athletic programs shall be maintained
as a vital component of the educational program and student-athletes shall be an integral part of the student
body. The admission, academic standing and academic progress of student-athletes shall be consistent with the
policies and standards adopted by the institution for the student body in general." NCAA Const., art.2.4.
It. See NCAA, 1993-94 NCAA MANUAL arts. 1.1.3 (Laura E. Bollig ed., 1993) (establishes the primary
purpose of the NCAA: "to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and
the athlete as an integral part of the student body and by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between
intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.")
12. Friction between the roles of collegiate athletics and academics dates well before 1965. College sports
during the early 1900s featured "mercenary" athletes, players who went from school to school over several
seasons, taking the best offer to play various sports - one year at Yale and the next at Harvard. See PAUL
LAWRENCE, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT 22-23 (1987). Initial NCAA reforms sought to eliminate these
"mercenaries", some of which had no academic record whatsoever, and restrict participation in intercollegiate
sports to students actually pursuing a degree. See KENNETH L. SHROPSHiRE, AGENTS OF OPPORTUNITY 60
(1990). NCAA measures have often been draconian - under the 1947 "sanity code", athletic scholarships
were actually eliminated and financial awards were strictly need-based. See LAWRENCE at 41. The sanity code
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assure proper emphasis on educational objectives, to promote competitive equity among
institutions and to prevent exploitation of student athletes."'
' 3
The 1965 rule14 required incoming freshmen to have a high school GPA and stan-
dardized test score sufficient to "predict" a college GPA of 1.6 on a 4.0 scale. 5 This
forecast was made by using a formula combining high school grades with the student's
SAT or ACT score. Students failing to meet the formula's benchmark were not eligible
to compete in intercollegiate athletics in their first year.
In 1973, the NCAA dropped the standardized test element from its eligibility equa-
tion, and student-athletes were required only to attain a GPA of 2.0 to compete.16 How-
ever, regardless of eligibility for freshman-year competition, any student-athlete could
receive an athletic scholarship. Once enrolled, students who fell below their university's
requirements for good academic standing were ineligible until their grades reached the
appropriate level.' 7
Notwithstanding the NCAA's efforts, by the early 1980s, it had become increasingly
clear that the NCAA was failing its mission. Mounting and well-publicized examples of
institutions exploiting student-athletes for their athletic talents,' 8 combined with low
graduation rates for many student-athletes,' 9 forced the NCAA to re-evaluate its eligi-
bility scheme.
20
had a short life, repealed once it became clear that under-the-table payments had replaced athletic scholarships,
and thus the winning schools were those that could beat the system. See id. at 48-49. Athletic scholarships
were reinstated shortly thereafter. See id.
13. NCAA Const., art.2, rule 2.12.
14. codified as NCAA Bylaw 4-6-(b)-(1). This rule represented a shift away from the NCAA's traditional
"home-rule" policy which had allowed each institution to unilaterally determine an incoming freshman's
eligibility.
15. See id.
16. See NCAA, 1983 NCAA CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS app. at 35 (1983).
17. See NCAA OPERATING BYLAWS arts. 14.01.1, 14.02.5, reprinted in NCAA, 1991-92 NCAA MANUAL
(Laura E. Bollig ed., 1991).
18. See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 411 (7th Cir. 1992) (Kevin Ross, a functional
illiterate and college basketball player, filed suit against Creighton University for negligent admission and
educational malpractice alleging that while he was recruited to play sports for the university, he was denied the
opportunity to obtain a meaningful education. The Seventh Circuit denied Ross' claim on public policy
grounds). Dexter Manley, an All-Pro lineman for the Washington Redskins, announced in U. S. News &
World Report that he graduated from Oklahoma State University unable to read! See Tom Callahan, Pro
Football's Everyman, Dec. 17, 1990, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 78.
19. A 1981 survey unveiled that only fifty-two percent of male athletes who entered college in the fall of
1975 had graduated within 5 years. See Ron Waicukauski, The Regulation of Academic Standards in
Intercollegiate Athletics, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 79, 94 (1982). Another study revealed that of the professional
basketball players who had attended four-year colleges and universities, thirty percent had received a
bachelor's degree. Id. at 93. When the test pool is narrowed to Division I or "big time" college athletics, the
numbers are even more bleak. One out of six big-time football and basketball players ever graduate from
college. See FRANCIS X. DEALY, JR., WIN AT ANY COST: THE SELL OUT OF COLLEGE ATHLETICS 96 (1990).
The University of Houston went twenty-five years without graduating a black basketball player, until Elvin
Hayes, who returned to college in 1987 after finishing his NBA career, received his degree. Id. at 98. Memphis
State University went twelve years without graduating a black basketball player. Id.
20. The NCAA was under heavy pressure from the media and university presidents who saw the then
current system as allowing institutions to "recruit[] educationally ill-prepared, but physically talented, minority
athletes, use them until they exhausted their athletic eligibility, then discard them ... still without the ability to




In an effort to stiffen its eligibility requirements, the NCAA enacted Proposition 48,
which took effect in August, 1986. 21 Proposition 48 required, first, that student-athletes
attain a 2.0 GPA in an eleven-course core curriculum which included courses in English,
math, natural sciences and social sciences. Second, Proposition 48 required a high
school athlete to achieve a score of 700 out of 1600 on the SAT, or 15 out of 36 on the
ACT. Failing to meet the conditions of Proposition 48 had the dual effect of rendering
student-athletes ineligible to compete and ineligible for athletic scholarships.
Proposition 48, and in particular, the standardized test score requirement, has been
sharply criticized from its inception for allegedly discriminating unfairly against Afri-
can-American student-athletes.22 Critics of Proposition 48 allege that the standardized
tests used by the NCAA exhibit inherent racial bias or, in the alternative, they at least
result in the exclusion of an unacceptably disproportionate number of African-
Americans from intercollegiate competition and scholarship consideration.23 Moreover,
given that many African-American student-athletes are wholly dependent upon athletic
scholarships to finance their college educations, it is argued that Proposition 48 effec-
tively deprived many African-American student-athletes of the opportunity to attend
college. 24 Opponents of Proposition 48 have compelling statistics in their corner. Ac-
cording to a 1990 report by the Knight Commission, over eighty-six percent of the foot-
ball and basketball players who fell victim to Proposition 48 were African-American. 5
Of those Proposition 48 casualties, an overwhelming percentage cleared the first hurdle,
the GPA provision, yet faltered on the second, the standardized test criteria.
2 6
In response, the NCAA maintains that its test score requirements are necessary be-
cause while GPAs are vulnerable to leniency at the high school and collegiate levels,
standardized test scores establish a uniform measure of academic capability.2 7 The
NCAA also points to the alleged success of its eligibility rules scheme by highlighting
increased graduation rates since Proposition 48's implementation.
On January 7, 1992, the NCAA again voted to raise the academic bar for incoming
athletes, and in 1995, the heightened initial eligibility requirements, known as Proposi-
tion 16, took effect. 28 Proposition 16 introduced a sliding scale system under which a
high school student may use a higher GPA to offset a lower SAT or ACT score. Under
this scheme, a high school athlete with a 2.0 GPA must have an SAT score of 900 to be
eligible, while a student with a 2.5 GPA may have an SAT score of 700 to qualify.29
While Proposition 16 arguably allays the concerns of some critics by placing less em-
phasis on test scores, it does little to mitigate against the argument that any use of the
standardized tests is discriminatory.
21. See NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 3.
22. See generally Laura Pentimone, The National Collegiate Athletic Association's Quest to Educate the
Student-Athlete: Are the Academic Eligibility Requirements an Attempt to Foster Academic Integrity or Merely
to Promote Racism, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 471,494-99 (1998).
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. The Knight Commission, a special commission of the Knight Foundation, a philanthropic foundation,
was issued the task of investigating the reform efforts in intercollegiate athletics. See Timothy Davis, The
Myth of the Superspade: The Persistence of Racism in College Athletics, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615, 620
(1995).
26. In 1989, 85.4% of freshman ineligible due to Proposition 48 failed to attain the test-score requirement.
See Michael R. Lufrano, The NCAA's Involvement in Setting Academic Standards, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L.
97, 104 n.37 (1994).
27. See Pentimone, supra note 22.




HI. Cureton v. NCAA
On January 8, 1997, Tai Kwan Cureton and Leatrice Shaw, both individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated, filed suit against the NCAA in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.30 Cureton and Shaw were two Phila-
delphia student-athletes who graduated in the top of their respective high school classes
and were recruited for track competition by numerous Division I schools. 3' However,
Cureton and Shaw failed to meet the standardized test cutoff score under Proposition 16,
and consequently, were denied the opportunity to compete in intercollegiate athletics
during their freshman year at Division I schools, denied athletic scholarships by Divi-
sion I schools, and denied admission to Division I schools. 32 Plaintiffs Cureton and
Shaw alleged that the NCAA's operation of Proposition 16, and particularly, the practice
of denying eligibility for failure to meet the Proposition's minimum standardized test
score requirement, resulted in unlawful racial discrimination in violation of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.33 Plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction against the
NCAA's continued implementation and operation of Proposition 16.
On October 9, 1997, Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter denied defendant NCAA's motion
to dismiss, and in so ruling, endorsed plaintiffs' claim to an implied private right of
action for disparate impact discrimination under Title VI and its implementing regula-
tions. 35 On March 8, 1999, Judge Buckwalter, presented with cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment, held: (i) the NCAA is subject to suit under Title VI, and (ii) Proposition
16 has an unjustified disparate impact against African-Americans, thereby entitling
plaintiffs to judgment as a matter of law on the merits of their Title VI claim. 36 Accord-
ingly, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was granted and defendant's motion,
denied.37 The judge declared Proposition 16 illegal and granted the plaintiffs' request for
permanent injunctive relief.38 The court was careful to cabin the scope of its ruling to
permanently enjoining the NCAA from denying eligibility based on failure to meet the
standardized test score requirement of Proposition 16, and explicitly declined to address
the propriety of the proposition's GPA or course requirements components.39
30. See Cureton, 1998 WL 961387, at *1. On December 18, 1998, Judge Buckwalter of the District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted Andrea Gardner and Alexander Wesby's Motion to be
Recognized as Intervenors Aligned With the Named Plaintiffs. Id. at *3.
31. See Race Discrimination Suit Over NCAA's Eligibility Rules to Go to Trial, Oct. 1997, ANDREWS
SPORTS & ENT. Lr. REP., 4.
32. See Cureton, 37 F.Supp.2d at 687.
33. See Cureton, 37 F.Supp.2d at 689.
34. Plaintiffs also prayed for (1) the entry of a declaratory judgment of Title VI liability, (2) a notification
to Division I schools that student-athletes who satisfy the minimum GPA/core course requirement of
Proposition 16 are immediately eligible to participate in freshman year athletics, and (3) the provision of a
fourth year of eligibility under the NCAA rules for those student-athletes who have lost a year of freshman
eligibility at Division I schools due to the minimum test score requirement of Proposition 16. Id.
35. Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. CIV.A.97-131, 1997 WL 634376, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 9, 1997).
36. Cureton, 37 F.Supp.2d at 689.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 715.
39. Id. "Properly interpreted, the order only enjoins the NCAA from denying eligibility based on the




Plaintiffs brought their claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 0 Title
VI contains two separate sections which provide different enforcement mechanisms.
Section 601, the main provision of Title VI, provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color,or national origin,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
41
Section 602 requires federal agencies to promulgate their own implementing regulations
which delineate the procedures for ensuring that beneficiaries of federal funding are not
pursuing policies having discriminatory impacts. Section 602 provides:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal finan-
cial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other
than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the
provisions of section 2000d of this title with respect to such program or activity by
issuingrules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent
with the achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assis-
tance in connection with which the action is taken.42
Judge Buckwalter noted in his October 9, 1997 Memorandum: "[p]laintiffs' complaint is
not clear as to whether it is alleging a violation of the act [Section 601] or its regulations
[Section 602].' ' 4 However, the judge deciphered that"... what plaintiffs . assert as
their sole cause of action in paragraph 33 of the complaint is that defendant's proposi-
tion 16 violates the implementing regulations of Title VI.""
The difference between an action under the Act, Section 601, and an action under its
implementing regulations, Section 602, is significant. The Supreme Court has drawn a
distinction between the two, in that an action under Section 601 requires a showing of
intentional discrimination, whereas an action under Section 602 requires the lesser
showing of discriminatory impaCt.45 In 1974, in Lau v. Nichols,4 6 the Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff could prove a violation of Section 602 regulations upon a showing
of disparate impact: "Discrimination is barred which has that effect even though no pur-
poseful design is present.'-47 In 1983, in Guardians Association, et al. v. Civil Service
Commission of the City of New York,48 the Supreme Court pronounced that Section 601
required proof of intentional discrimination, but under 602 regulations, a showing of
disparate impact may be sufficient. 49 In Cureton, the court's characterization of the suit
as a "602" claim was likely dispositive. Had the action been cast as a "601" claim, such
40. Cureton, 37 F.Supp.2d at 689.
41. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000d (1988).
42. Id. Sec. 2000d-l.
43. Cureton, 1997 WL 634376, at *1. Judge Buckwalter used "Title VI" referring only to Section 601, and
used "regulations" referring only to Section 602. Unless otherwise indicated, the author will do the same.
44. Id.
45. See generally Bradford C. Mank, Is There a Private Cause of Action Under EPA's Title VI
Regulations?: The Need to Empower Environmental Justice Plaintiffs, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1999). The
author is indebted to this article for initial direction with respect to Title VI jurisprudence.
46. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
47. See id. at 568:
48. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
49. See id. at 584.
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a label would have sounded the death knell for the plaintiffs. Indeed, the possibility of
these plaintiffs successfully showing that the NCAA intentionally discriminated against
them through the operation of Proposition 16 was remote. As such, a Section 602 claim
permitted the plaintiffs to proceed with a significantly lighter evidentiary burden.
However, two preliminary questions needed to be answered before plaintiffs could
proceed to the merits of their Title VI claim. First, is a private right of action implied
under Title VI's implementing regulations? Stated another way, does Section 602 create
an enforcement scheme which provides for any individual remedies or rights of partici-
pation? Second, is the NCAA subject to Title VI? This second inquiry has two compo-
nents - first, whether the NCAA a "program or activity" within the purview of Title VI,
and second, whether the NCAA receives "Federal financial assistance". These threshold
questions are cumulative, that is, a negative answer to any of them would have doomed
the plaintiffs' claim. Taking the issues seriatim, we turn to the court's analysis.
B. Is a Private Right of Action Implied Under Title VI's Regulations?
Neither Section 601 nor 602 expressly creates a private right of action. The ensuing
issue, then, is whether the court may imply such a right. The court begins its treatment of
this paramount inquiry by confirming that a private right of action does exist under Sec-
tion 601. Citing Guardians, the judge confirms that "[it is clear, and both sides agree,
that the Supreme Court endorsed an implied private right of action under Title VI."50
Notwithstanding the judge's casual observation that "a review of the law would be su-
perfluous," at least for purposes of this Comment, the author must disagree. While a
Section 602 private right of action may not necessarily be inferred from a Section 601
private right, the absence of a private right of action under Section 601 would speak
strongly to a corresponding absence under Section 602.
In 1979, the Supreme Court recognized in Cannon v. University of Chicago5' a pri-
vate right of action for plaintiffs bringing suit under Title IX of the 1972 Education Act
Amendments.52 Title IX prohibits discrimination in educational institutions that receive
federal funds.53 The Cannon Court inferred an implied private right of action under Title
IX by analogizing it to Title VI. Noting that Congress patterned Title IX after Title VI,
including the use of almost identical statutory language, Justice Stevens' majority opin-
ion reasoned: "In 1972 when Title IX was enacted, the critical language in [section 601
of] Title VI had already been construed as creating a private remedy." 54 Thus, although
Cannon did not explicitly acknowledge an implied right of action under Title VI, courts
have interpreted Cannon as virtually inferring such a right under Title TX and Title VI.55
Four years after Cannon, a class of African-American and Hispanic police officers
filed suit under Title VI alleging that New York City Police Department written exami-
nations - used to make hiring decisions and to determine layoffs among officers with
equal seniority - had a discriminatory impact on minority candidates and officers in
Guardians Association, et al. v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New York.56 In
ruling for the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court erased any remaining doubt as to the exis-
tence of a private right of action under Title VI.
50. Cureton, 1997 WL 634376, at *1.
51. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
52. Id. at 709.
53. 20 U.S.C. Secs. 1681-82 (1988).
54. 441 U.S. at 696.
55. See, eg., Chowdbury v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Cntr., 677 F.2d 317, 319 n.2 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that
courts have consistently held the Title IX language of Cannon "to be applicable in discussions of Title V").
56. 463 U.S. at 584.
20001
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However, whether a private right of action can be implied under the implementing
regulations of Title VI remained indeterminate. Cannon did not address the issue of
whether there was also a private right of action under Title IX or Title VI's regulations.
The Cureton court cites to Guardians in hastily concluding that a private right of action
exists under Title VI regulations. Although a persuasive argument could be made that
Guardians does create an implied private right of action under Title VI's regulations, it
is a complex hybrid opinion, and thus warrants closer examination. Judge Buckwalter
turned to Justice White's Guardians opinion in particular to support his conclusion that
Title VI's regulations properly permit the implication of a private right of action:
The threshold issue before the Court is whether the private plaintiffs in this case need
to prove discriminatory intent to establish a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ... and administrative implementing regulations promulgated thereun-
der. I conclude, as do four other Justices, in separate o~inions, that the Court of Ap-
peals erred in requiring proof of discriminatory intent. [emphasis added]
Judge Buckwalter's sole reliance on Justice White's opinion may be misplaced. Specifi-
cally, Justice White's opinion, unlike Judge Buckwalter's, 58 recognized a private right of
action for disparate impact under Section 601, 59 without clearly addressing the issue of
whether a private right of action exists pursuant to Section 602. Therefore, Justice
White's opinion supports Judge Buckwalter's conclusion only insofar as it can be in-
ferred that by approving of a discriminatory impacts claim under Section 601, White
also would recognize private actions alleging discriminatory impact under Section 602.
Justice Stevens' Guardians opinion, which was joined by Justices Blackmun and
Brennan, resembled Judge Buckwalter's opinion and clashes with Justice White's find-
ing that proof of intentional discrimination is necessary under Section 601, but that evi-
dence of disparate impact is sufficient to carry a claim under the regulations. 60 Justice
Stevens' opinion also stated that victims of disparate impact discrimination are entitled
to all forms of relief, including, presumably, compensatory damages. 61 Taking these two
premises together -- that a disparate impact plaintiff must, under Stevens' opinion, pur-
sue his or her claim under 602, and that such a plaintiff is entitled to all forms of relief --
strongly suggests that Stevens and the concurring justices inferred a private right of
action under Title VI's implementing regulations.
Finally, Justice Marshall's dissent also implied a private right of action under Sec-
tion 602.62 What Guardians gives us, then, is five Supreme Court Justices, in three sepa-
rate opinions, implicitly recognizing a private right of action for disparate impacts dis-
crimination under the implementing regulations of Title VI. Yet, Guardians alone still
provides a slender reed upon which to rest a Cureton-type claim because the High Court
never expressly held that a private right of action exists under the regulations.
The Cureton court also cites to language in Alexander v. Choate63 in which the Su-
preme Court suggested that Guardians did create an implied private right of action un-
57. Cureton, 1997 WL 634376, at *2 (quoting Guardians, 463 U.S. at 582) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
58. Judge Buckwalter understood that "Title VI, on its face, seems to permit only actions based upon
intentional discrimination." 1997 WL 634376, at *1.
59. See Guardians, 463 U.S. 582, 584, 589-93 (White, J., delivering judgment of the Court).
60. See id. at 583, 641-45 (Stevens, Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
61. See id. at 645 (Stevens, Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
62. See id. at 615,625 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
63. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
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der the regulations.64 However, the Alexander precedent suffers from the same infirmity
as does Guardians in that it too never explicitly holds that there is a private claim of
right under Title VI's implementing regulations. Nonetheless, Cureton finds comfort in
several circuit courts of appeal which have also cited to Guardians and Alexander in
support of their conclusions that a private individual may enforce the implementing
regulations of Title VI.
65
Paradoxically, the best support for Cureton's endorsement of a private right of ac-
tion under Title VI's implementing regulations comes from a Third Circuit decision
recently vacated as moot by the Supreme Court. In 1996, in Chester Residents Con-
cernedfor Quality Living v. Sei 66 one of Judge Buckwalter's colleagues in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania declined to recognize a private right of action under Title VI's
implementing regulations. 67 The plaintiffs, residents of Chester, Pennsylvania, alleged
that the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, by approving a private
company's request to build a waste treatment facility in an area already home to several
waste processing plants, placed a disparate burden on the predominantly African-
American population of Chester Township.68 District Judge Dalzell found that the
plaintiffs' complaint showed only disparate impact, thereby precluding an action under
601 which he ruled required proof of intentional discrimination. 69 The court then found
a claim under 602 equally unavailing as it rejected a private right of action under Title
VI's implementing regulations.7° Significantly, the Chester court, in so ruling, found
that the Supreme Court had not decided whether a private right of action exists under
Title VI's regulations.
71
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that Title VI's im-
plementing regulations do create a private right of action.72 The court arrived at its deci-
sion by invoking a three-part test for determining whether a private right of action ex-
ists:
(1) whether the agency rule is properly within the scope of the enabling statute;
(2) whether the enabling statute intended to create a private right of action; and
(3) whether the implication of a private right of action under the regulation will
further the purpose of the enabling statute.73
64. See Cureton, 1997 WL 634376, at *2. (quoting Alexander, 469 U.S. at 294: "Guardians, therefore,
does not support petitioner's blanket proposition that federal law proscribes only intentional discrimination
against the handicapped. Indeed, to the extent our holding in Guardians is relevant to the interpretation of Sec.
504, Guardians suggests that the regulations implementing Sec. 504, upon which respondents in part rely,
could make actionable the disparate impact challenged in this case.")
65. See, e.g., New York Urban League v. N.Y., 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Guardians and
Alexander and allowing plaintiffs' disparate impact claim under Title VI's regulations); Elston v. Talladega
County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406, 1407 & n. 14 (11 th Cir. 1993) (citing Guardians and Alexander,
the court found the district court's application of a disparate impact analysis to action under Title VI
regulations to be proper); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981-82 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Guardians, and
finding proof of discriminatory impact sufficient when action brought to enforce regulations issued pursuant to
the statute).
66. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 944 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Pa. 1996), rev'd 132
F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 22 (1998).
67. Id. at 417.
68. ld. at 414, n.1.
69. Id. at 417.
70. Id.
71. Id., n.5.
72. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated, 119 S.
Ct. 22 (1998).
73. Id. at 932 (quoting Angelastoro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F. 2d 939, 947 (3d Cir. 1985)).
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The Third Circuit concluded that Title VI's regulations met parts one and three.74 With
respect to part two, the court confirmed that Congress did intend to authorize a private
right of action under Title VI's implementing regulations.75 The Third Circuit found
"some indication" and then "uncontroverted evidence" of congressional intent to create
a private right of action under the regulations implementing Title VI.
76
On June 8, 1998, the Supreme Court granted the State of Pennsylvania's petition for
writ of certiorari for review of the Third Circuit's holding that private rights of action
exist under Title VI's implementing regulations.7 7 However, on August 17, 1998, the
Court dismissed the case as moot and vacated the Third Circuit's decision. 7 Although
the Third Circuit's decision is no longer good law, it still has some value as an admit-
tedly imperfect predictor of how the Third Circuit may review Judge Buckwalter's
analysis on appeal. The forecast, at least for the Cureton plaintiffs, is optimistic.
In Cureton, Judge Buckwalter applied the same three-part test as invoked in Ches-
ter, and reached identical conclusions, with one analytical wrinkle.79 Similar to the
Chester panel, Judge Buckwalter found in Cureton that "[a]ffirmative answers to one
and three seem obvious. '80 However, Judge Buckwalter's reasoning in his affirmative
answer to part two does not rest on Congressional intent, but rather, on Guardians and
Alexander.8 1 This may be a misread of part two of the Third Circuit's test. However, it is
axiomatic that the Third Circuit can affirm Judge Buckwalter's conclusion without re-
lying on his rationale, and thus any error is unlikely to be reversible.
Although not precedent, when taken together, the holdings in Guardians, Alexander,
and Chester suggest the Third Circuit will approve of Cureton's recognition of a private
right of action under the implementing regulations of Title VI. Further, given the Su-
preme Court's interest in resolving the question, evinced by its granting certiorari in
Chester and given the cleanness of the issue as presented in Cureton, it may prove to be
the Supreme Court's second bite at the apple.
C. Is the NCAA Subject to Tide VI?
Title VI and its implementing regulations prohibit discrimination "on the ground of
race ... under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."82 Thus,
the Cureton court considered whether the NCAA is a "program or activity" within the
purview of Title VI, and whether the NCAA receives federal financial assistance.
74. Id. at 933, 936.
75. Id. at 933-34.
76. Id. at 934.
77. Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. granted,
118 S. Ct. 2296, vacated, 119 S. Ct. 22 (1998).
78. Id.
79. Cureton, 1997 WL 634376, at *1 (citing Angelastoro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935 (1985).
80. Id.
81. Id. at *2.
82. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000d-! 201(d) (1994).
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1. Is the NCAA a Program or Activity Covered by Title VI?
The Cureton court cites to Title VI's definition of "program or activity' 83 and sum-
marily concludes that "the NCAA appears to be a program or activity covered by Title
VI." 84 Presumably, the court fit the NCAA within either Section 3(a)(i) or Section
3(a)(ii), as it clearly does not fall within the other provisions. In any event, the court's
brevity of analysis simply reflected the uncontroverted nature of the issue.
2. Does the NCAA Receive Federal Financial Assistance?
A plain reading of Title VI yields that its strictures, and those of its regulations, ap-
ply only to those institutions, programs, or organizations that receive federal financial
assistance.85 Consistent with this unambiguous language, the Supreme Court has inter-
preted "recipient" narrowly. Three Supreme Court decisions are instructive.
Grove City College v. Bell86 involved the refusal of a private liberal arts college to
execute Assurances of Compliance with federal civil rights laws. Because the college's
students received tuition grants through the Department of Education, the Department
demanded that the college execute an Assurance of Compliance pursuant to the imple-
menting regulations of Title IX. After the college refused, the Department instituted
proceedings to terminate the federal grants. The Supreme Court held that colleges are
covered by Title IX by virtue of their students' receipt of federal tuition grants. That
holding was based explicitly on "powerful evidence of Congress' intent" that colleges
and universities are meant to be recipients of this aid. 87 Grove City teaches simply that
an indirect recipient of federal funds may fall within Title IX, and by analogy, Title VI,
when Congress clearly views that entity as an intended recipient.
This reading of Grove City was confirmed in United States Dep't of Transp. V.
Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 88 where the question was whether Section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act - prohibiting discrimination against disabled persons in any program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance - applies to commercial airlines. Airlines
do not receive federal aid.89 Airports do.90 Plaintiffs reasoned that "airlines are 'indirect
recipients' of aid to the airports," because "airport operators convert the [aid] into
83. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000d-4a provides that the term "program or activity" means "all of the operations" of
any of the following entities if "any part of' the entity in question is extended federal financial assistance:
I. certain State or local government agencies, departments, districts or
instrumentalities;
2. a college, university, other postsecondary institution, public system of higher
education, or localeducational agency, system of vocational education, or other
school system;
3. (a) an entire corporation, partnership, or other private organization, or an entire
sole proprietorship if: (i) assistance is extended to such an entity as a whole; or(ii)
the entity is "principally engaged in the business of providing education, health
care, housing, social services, or parks and recreation;" or (b) the "entire plant or
other comparable, geographically separate facility to which Federal financial
assistance is extended, in the case of any other corporation, partnership, private
organization, or sole proprietorship;" and
4. "any other entity which is established by two or more of the entities described in
paragraphs (1), (2) or (3)."
Cureton, 1997 WL 634376, at *1.
84. Cureton, 1997 WL 634376, at *2.
85. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000d (1988).
86. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
87. Id. at 569.
88. United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
89. Id. at 605.
90. Id. at 604.
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Orunways and give the federal assistance - now in the form of a runway - to the air-
lines." 91 The Supreme Court disagreed. Finding no evidence that Congress intended the
airlines to be recipients, the Court held that Section 504 "covers those who receive the
aid, but does not extend as far as those who benefit from it."
92
Finally, in Smith v. NCAA, 93 the Supreme Court held that the NCAA's receipt of
membership dues from its federally funded members does not subject it to Title IX.
Once again, the Court focused on the intent of Congress: "There is no allegation that
NCAA members paid their dues with federal funds earmarked for that purpose." 94 The
Supreme Court has thus repeatedly conditioned the legal conclusion that an entity is a
"recipient" upon a finding that such entity's receipt of federal funds was intended by
Congress.
In Cureton, plaintiffs advanced no less than five theories in support of their argu-
ment that the NCAA either directly or indirectly receives federal financial assistance.
First, plaintiffs submitted that since the NCAA receives dues from member institutions,
and those institutions receive federal funds, it follows that the NCAA indirectly receives
federal financial assistance.95 Presented with an argument identical to the one rejected in
Smith v. NCAA, the Cureton court held:
[p]laintiffs may no longer rely solely on this theory to establish that the NCAA re-
ceives federal funds sufficient to subject the NCAA to suit under Title VI because
"[a]t most, the Association's receipt of dues demonstrates it indirectly benefits from
the federal assistance afforded its members. This showing, without more, is insuffi-
cient to trigger Title [V1] coverage."%
The court's dismissal of plaintiffs' first theory represented an effortless extension of the
Supreme Court's "intended recipient" jurisprudence.
Plaintiffs' second theory, that the NCAA directly receives federal financing through
the "Fund" 97 because the Fund is merely the NCAA's alter ego, remains unresolved as
the court concluded plaintiffs' argument "can neither be made nor refuted based upon
the present record before the court."98 Therefore, because the plaintiffs "failed to sustain
their heavy burden of 'piercing the corporate veil,"' their alter ego theory necessarily
failed. 99
Having declined to adopt the plaintiffs' first two theories, the court embraced their
third theory, which reasoned that the NCAA indirectly receives federal financial assis-
tance through the Fund by virtue of the NCAA's complete control over the Fund. Im-
pressed by the plaintiffs' evidence that the NCAA exercises effective control over the
block grant given to the Fund by the United States Department of Health and Human
91. Id. at 606.
92. Id. at 607.
93. NCAA v. Smith, 119 S.Ct. 924 (1999).
94. Id. at 929 (emphasis added).
95. See Cureton, 37 F.Supp.2d at 692 ("Plaintiffs attest that ... the NCAA admitted that it receives dues
from member schools who are recipients of federal funds. Accordingly, Plaintiffs conclude that the NCAA
indirectly receives federal financial assistance because the NCAA acts as the member institutions' agent with
respect to the governance of intercollegiate athletics") Id.
96. Id. at 693 (citing Smith v. NCAA, 119 S. Ct. 924 (1999)).
97. The "Fund" or National Youth Sports Program Fund is an enrichment program for economically
disadvantaged youths that provides summer education and sports instruction on the campuses of NCAA
member and non-member institutions of higher education, and is, indisputably, a recipient of federal funds. Id.
at 692, 694.




Services, the court concluded that the Fund is "merely a conduit through which the
NCAA makes all of the decisions about the Fund and the use of federal funds.""' Ac-
cordingly, the court labeled the NCAA an "indirect recipient" of federal financial assis-
tance, and consequently, subject to Title VI and its regulations.
I0 l
This conclusion is suspect in light of the Supreme Court's persistent focus on Con-
gressional intent as the touchstone of determining who is an indirect recipient. The Cu-
reton court failed to offer any basis to conclude that the NCAA is the Congressionally
intended recipient of any moneys granted to the Fund. Absent such a finding, the rela-
tionship between the Fund and the NCAA, while relevant, should have been insufficient
to carry the day. As the Supreme Court said in Paralyzed Veterans, entities that have not
received federal funds may not be covered by Title VI even if "they are 'inextricably
intertwined' with an [entity] that has."' 0 2
The court collapsed Plaintiff's fourth and fifth theories into one, noting they were
different only in degree and not in kind.'0 3 Plaintiffs' fourth and fifth theories argued,
respectively, that member schools who receive federal funds have created and comprise
the NCAA while the NCAA governs its members with respect to athletics rules and that
recipients of federal financial assistance have ceded controlling authority over a feder-
ally funded program to the NCAA, which then becomes subject to Title VI regardless of
whether it is itself a recipient. Quoting the language of plaintiffs' fifth theory, the court
determined that "irrespective of whether it receives federal funds, directly or indirectly,"
the NCAA is subject to suit under Title VI because member institutions have delegated
"controlling authority" over federally funded programs to the NCAA. 1°4 Judge Buck-
walter does not cite one case in his ruling that the NCAA falls within the ambit of Title
VI "irrespective of its receipt of federal funds." The omission is telling.
Title VI's regulations prohibit disparate impact discrimination only by a "recipient"
of federal funds. 105 "Recipient" is defined as any entity or individual "to whom Federal
financial assistance is extended, directly or through another recipient, for any pro-
gram.' 0 6 Under this definition, the NCAA is simply not a "recipient," and therefore not
subject to the regulations. Thus, even if the "controlling authority" theory has some
footing under the statutory language, which is itself a dubious proposition, the theory
cannot be utilized for claims that arise solely under the regulations.'
0 7
Moreover, any argument that the NCAA is subject to liability regardless of its status
as a recipient has been implicitly rejected by the Supreme Court. In Paralyzed Veterans,
the Court said that "[u]nder the program-specific statutes, Title VI, Title IX, and Sec.
504, Congress enters into an arrangement in the nature of a contract with the recipients
of the funds: the recipients' acceptance of the funds triggers coverage under the non-




102. 477 U.S. at 610.
103. Cureton, 37 F.Supp.2d at 694.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 45 C.F.R. Sec. 80.3(b)(2); 34 C.F.R. Sec. 100.3(b)(2).
107. 45 C.F.R. Sec. 80.13(i); 34 C.F.R. Sec. 100.13(i).
108. Paralyzed Veterans makes plain that "Congress limited the scope of [the program-specific statutes] to
those who actually 'receive'federal financial assistance because it sought to impose... coverage as a form of





Judge Buckwalter disregards this contractual limitation on Title VI's reach and instead
gives the statute "almost limitless coverage.
'' 10
In sum, under the first theory accepted by the court, the NCAA is an "indirect re-
cipient" of federal funds. Under the second, the NCAA is not a recipient of federal
funds, but nonetheless is subjected to Title VI by virtue of its relationship to member
institutions. The court's analysis of this "controlling authority" theory is tenuous in the
face of the clear mandate of the statute, namely, that the NCAA must be a recipient of
federal funds and given the contractual nature of the relationship. If the Third Circuit
declines to accept that the NCAA is an "indirect recipient," which remains an open
question considering the incongruity of Judge Buckwalter's analysis, the judge's "con-
trolling authority" analysis may prove to be the Achilles' heel of the Cureton decision.
IV. Does Proposition 16 Have an Unjustified Disparate Impact?
Having deputized the plaintiffs .by recognizing a private right of action under Title
VI's regulations, and having pulled the NCAA within the reach of Tile VI, the Cureton
court finally could turn to the merits of the plaintiffs' claim. Recalling that the court
interpreted the suit to be a "602" claim, the operative question was whether Proposition
16 - which requires students to achieve a minimum score on either the SAT or ACT as a
condition of eligibility to participate in intercollegiate athletics and/or receive athleti-
cally related financial aid during their freshman year - had an unjustified disparate im-
pact against African-Americans.' 1'
The Supreme Court introduced the theory of disparate impact discrimination in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.112 when it held that a plaintiff need not necessarily prove
intentional discrimination to establish an employer's violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act." 3 "Although the disparate impact theory was originally developed in cases
involving employment discrimination, courts have subsequently applied the theory to
claims brought pursuant to the regulations implementing Title VI."' 1 4 Title VI disparate-
impact proof entails a three-step analysis. First, to state a claim for disparate-impact
discrimination, plaintiffs must demonstrate that a facially neutral selection practice has
caused a racially disproportionate impact."15 Second, upon a successful showing by
plaintiff, the burden of rebuttal shifts to the defendant, who must show that the selection
practice causing the disproportionate effect is justified by an "educational necessity.
'' 
16
On rebuttal, the defendant only bears a burden of producing evidence to support its edu-
cational necessity. 17 Finally, should the defendant meet their burden of production,
plaintiff may nonetheless prevail by: (i) discrediting the asserted educational necessity,
or (ii) proffering an equally effective alternative practice resulting in less disparate im-
pact while still advancing the articulated educational necessity. 1
8
111. Id. at 608.
112. Cureton, 37 F.Supp.2d at 689.
113. Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
114. See Cureton, 37 F.Supp. 2d at 696.
115. See id. at 696-97 (citing NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1331 (3d Cir. 1981); New York
Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995); Quarles v. Oxford Mun. Sep. Sch. Dist.,
868 F.2d 750, 754 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1989); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 982 nn. 9-10 (9th Cir. 1984); Elston v.
Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 & n. 14 (11 th Cir. 1993)).
116. See id. at 697 (citing Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-57 (1989)).
117. See id. (citing Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of New York v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130,151 (1979)).
118. See id. (citing Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659-60).




A. Do Plaintiffs Present a Prima Facie Case of Proposition 16's Racially Dis-
proportionate Effects?
In addressing the nature of proof needed to show a disproportionate impact, Cureton
established that statistical proof alone can make out a prima facie case. 9 As to the
quality of proof, Cureton required statistical evidence showing that a challenged practice
has caused the exclusion of candidates from a particular opportunity because of their
membership in a protected group.' 20 The court also noted the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission's "80% rule" as a common basis for determining the sufficiency
of statistical evidence. 21 Under the EEOC rule, which the court confirms is "entitled to
great deference, ' 122 a selection rate that is less than 80% of the rate for the group with
the highest rate constitutes presumptive evidence of disparate impact.1
23
Armed with a stacked quiver of statistical evidence, plaintiffs easily hit the mark set
by the Cureton court. Plaintiffs' compelling submissions, the majority of which were
plucked from the NCAA's own files, included: (1) of those African-American student-
athletes appearing on a Division I Institution Request List submitted to the NCAA Initial
Eligibility Clearinghouse, 26.6% did not meet Proposition 16 standards in 1996, and
21.4% did not qualify in 1997 (compared to 6.4% of white student-athletes in 1996 and
4.2% in 1997); 124 (2) preliminary enrollment data for 1994-1996 showed a drop in the
proportion of African-Americans among first-year scholarship athletes in Division I
from 23.6% to 20.3% (juxtaposed with a 2.0% increase in white student-athletes);
125
(3) Proposition 16's minimum standardized test score was the factor causing the greatest
degree of disparate impact, as only 67.4% of African-American college-bound student-
athletes cleared the test score hurdle, as compared to 91.1% of white college-bound
student-athletes; 126 finally, (4) application of the EEOC's test showed, in most instances,
that the selection rate of African-Americans is less than 80% that of the white selection
rate. 1
27
Rather than challenge plaintiffs' onslaught of statistical evidence, the NCAA clev-
erly attempted to reframe the lawsuit. The NCAA advanced that "the educational op-
portunity at issue was not the opportunity to participate in college athletics during the
freshman year, but rather, the opportunity to obtain a college degree."' 28 Operating from
this premise, the NCAA marshaled its own statistics showing that since the implemen-
tation of Proposition 16, African-American student-athletes were graduating at higher
rates.' 29 Following the NCAA's reasoning, if graduation, and not freshman-year eligi-
bility, was the opportunity at stake, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the requisite dis-
proportionate effect.130 However, defendant's attempt at misdirecting the Court's inquiry
rightly failed. The plaintiff is master of his claim, and as the court noted, "it is... this
educational opportunity that Plaintiffs are challenging, and not the opportunity to gradu-
120. Id. (citing Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650).
121. Id. (citing Watson, 487 U.S. at 994).
122. Id. at 700. (citing 2 BARBARA LINDEMAN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
1729 (3d ed. 1996)).
123. Id. (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,431 (1975)).
124. Id. (citing 1978 Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1607.4(D)
(1999)).
125. Id. at 698 (citing a July 27, 1998 NCAA Memorandum to the Division I membership).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 699 (citing a United States Department of Education Report).
128. Id. at 700.





ate.' '131 On the basis of plaintiffs' bare statistics, and defendant's admissions regarding
their veracity, the court concluded that plaintiffs had established a prima facie showing
of a racially disproportionate effect sufficient to shift the burden of rebuttal to the
NCAA.
132
B. Is Proposition 16's Use of Standardized Test Scores and its Resulting Dis-
parate Impact Justified by an Educational Necessity?
Once the burden has shifted to defendant to defend the discriminatory practice, "the
dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the le-
gitimate [educational] goals of the [institution]."' 3 3 The challenged practice must bear a
demonstrable "manifest relationship" to a legitimate educational goal.13 4 The defendant,
therefore, must identify the particular educational goal, and then, present objective evi-
dence of how the challenged practice significantly serves this identified goal.
1. Are the NCAA 's proffered goals legitimate educational aims of Proposition 16?
The NCAA submitted that "(1) raising student-athlete graduation rates, and (2)
closing the gap between black and white student-athlete graduation rates" are the justifi-
able educational goals of Proposition 16.135 The court implied a two-part test in ruling
on the legitimacy of the NCAA's goals. First, the court evaluated the facial validity of
the goal and asked whether the proffered goal represented a proper pursuit of the
NCAA. 136 Second, the court employed a legislative intent analysis and asked whether
documented evidence revealed that the articulated goal was in fact the impetus behind
the enactment of Proposition 16.'17
Applying the first prong of the test to the NCAA's first articulated goal, the court
premised that raising graduation rates is consistent with the primary mission of educa-
tional institutions, and concluded that the NCAA, as a surrogate of those institutions, is
properly within its role when it pursues this same objective with respect to student-
athletes. 138 As to the second step of the analysis, the court found "overwhelming and
abundant support for the proposition that the membership was concerned about raising
student-athlete graduation rates."' 39 Thus, the court concluded that the NCAA's stated
objective of raising student-athlete graduation rates was a legitimate educational goal.
140
The NCAA's second stated objective - bridging the gap between black and white
student-athlete graduation rates - did not fare as well. For the first part of its two-step
analysis, the court explained that there is "no support for an educational institution (let
alone its surrogate) to engage in such a goal."'141 The NCAA had argued that closing the
black-white gap is "a subject of longstanding concern in the educational and civil rights
communities."' 42 However, the court has intimated that this reality does not empower
132. Id. at 700.
133. Id. at 699-701.
134. Id. at 701 (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989)).
135. Id. (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,446 (1982)).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 702-06.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 703.
140. Id. at 703-04.
141. Id. at 704.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 705 (quoting Def.'s Response at 15).
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the NCAA to promulgate rules setting initial eligibility standards simply because it may
have a desired lateral effect. 143 Desirability and legality are not coextensive concepts.
With respect to the legislative history of Proposition 16, the court found
"[a]bsolutely nothing in the record - transcripts of convention proceedings, research
results, or memoranda - even suggest[ing] that this was a goal that motivated the prom-
ulgation of Proposition 16 or 48. ' 44 Moreover, the court believed that presenting such a
"'back-end' balancing between graduation rates as an express objective" of Proposition
16 violated "the Supreme Court's prohibition against using a 'bottom-line' defense to
disparate impact cases involving pass/fail selection practices.' '145 Accordingly, the court
did not tarry long in dismissing the stated goal of closing the gap between black and
white student-athlete graduation rates as an unjustifiable aim of Proposition 16.
2. Is There A Manifest Relationship?
Having rejected the validity of the NCAA's second proposed goal, the court turned
to whether the challenged practice, viz., using a particular standardized test cutoff score,
was manifestly related to achieving the surviving goal of raising student-athlete gradua-
tion rates.
Hinting at his uneasiness in such "uncharted territory,"' 146 Judge Buckwalter heeded:
"To the Court's knowledge, no court in this Circuit has yet ruled on the propriety of
using standardized test cutoff scores as a facially neutral selection practice.,' 147 Setting
out on his analysis, the judge established that the manifest relationship standard requires
the NCAA to produce objective evidence showing a nexus, or manifest relationship,
between the use of the particular Proposition 16 cutoff scores of SAT 820 and ACT 68,
and the NCAA's stated objective of raising student-athlete graduation rates. 148 Thus, a
showing by the NCAA that the general use of standardized test scores serves its identi-
fied goal would be inadequate. In fact, the court expressly declined to rule on this wider
issue of the general validity of using the SAT in initial eligibility rules. "4 9 Rather, the
court confined its inquiry to the narrow issue of whether the NCAA could demonstrate
that the particular cutoff score of SAT 820, serves, in a significant way, the goal of
raising student-athlete graduation rates.
"As with all facially neutral practices challenged under the disparate impact theory,
the use of a SAT cutoff score as a selection practice would be proper so long as it is
144. "The Court agrees that closing the black-white graduation gap is, as the NCAA states, 'a subject of
longstanding concern in the educational and civil rights communities.' However, that desirable outcome of
Proposition 16, actual or projected, is simply a collateral benefit of promulgating a rule that sets heightened
academic standards." Id.
145. id. at 704-05.
146. Id. at 705 (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,452-56 (1982)).
147. Id. at 707.
148. Id. at 706.
149. Id. (citing Newark Branch, NAACP v. Town of Harrison, New Jersey, 940 F.2d 792, 804 (3d Cir.
1991). "[F]or ease of discussion, the Court will only refer to the SAT cutoff score of 820, although the analysis
applies with equal force to the ACT cutoff score of 68." Id. at 707. The author will do the same.
150. "[Tlhe Court stresses that this case does not preclude the use of the SAT, or any particular cutoff score
of the SAT, in the NCAA's adoption of an initial eligibility rule." Id. at 712. But, the court cautions: "It may
be 'that no strong statistical basis exist[s] for the use of any particular single minimum test score,' but that is
for the NCAA to determine ,more definitively after undertaking an appropriate analysis justifying an
independent basis for choosing a cutoff score." (emphasis added) Id.
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justified."'150 "[Tihere should be some independent basis for choosing the cutoff.' ' 15
Simply put, the NCAA must show there is something special about an SAT score of
820.
The NCAA relied solely on the general predictive ability of the SAT on graduation
rates of student-athletes in justifying the cutoff score. 152 The court found that, in so do-
ing, "[the NCAA] has failed to analyze the issue in terms of what factors affect the
graduation rate in addition to Proposition 16, thereby concomitantly failing to control
for those variables.' 5 3 The court continued,
... [the NCAA] cannot possibly know with any degree of certainty whether the pre-
dicted increases in graduation rates are attributable to numerous factors other than
the 820 cutoff score. Merely examining the outcomes of the initial eligibility rules
does not demonstrate that the choice of the particular cutoff score in question serves
the goal in a significant way.' -4
Thus, while the NCAA's argument may be literally correct - accepting their position
that the SAT does have some predictive ability of graduation rates - it is legally incor-
rect, for the NCAA could not show an independent basis for choosing SAT score 820.
Were the court to accept the NCAA's proposition that SAT scores predict graduation
rates, and that therefore inferentially SAT score 820 significantly serves the goal,
seemingly any score would be justifiable. 1
55
The court found not only the analytical substance of the NCAA's arguments uncon-
vincing, but also the NCAA's deliberative process. "Significantly, the NCAA has failed
to articulate in any meaningful manner the decision making process behind the selection
of the 820 cutoff score."' 56 "[N]othing in the record supports the conclusion that the
cutoff score was adopted by the entire membership after due consideration of this is-
sue."'157 The court concluded that without presenting an independent basis for choosing
cutoff score 820, the NCAA failed to show how this score significantly served the goal
of raising student-athlete graduation rates. 1
58
Thus, although the NCAA's goal of raising graduation rates was deemed valid, its
failure to prove a manifest relationship between Proposition 16's cutoff score and its
stated goal eventually crippled its defense.
151. Id. at 707 (citing Groves v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 776 F.Supp. 1518, 1531 (M.D. Ala. 1991). A
"particular cutoff score affecting student-athlete graduation rates 'should normally be set so as to be
reasonable and consistent with normal expectations of the acceptable proficiency' of student-athletes towards
attaining a college degree."' Id. at 707-08 (citing 1978 Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures, 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1607.5(H) (1999)). See also Guardians Ass'n of the N.Y. Police Dep't v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79, 105 (2d Cir. 1980) ("No matter how valid the exam, it is the cutoff score that
ultimately determines whether a person passes or fails. A cutoff score unrelated to job performance may well
lead to the rejection of applicants who were fully capable of performing the job. When a cutoff score unrelated
to job performance produces disparate results, Title VI is violated.") Id.
152. Id. at 708.(citing Guardians, 630 F.2d at 105).
153. Id. at 709.
154. Id.
155. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
156. "Taken to its logical end, the NCAA's proffered 'manifest relationship' is tantamount to a
rationalization of any cutoff score, once the SAT's predictive ability is presumed." Id.
157. Id. at 710.
158. Id. at711.
159. Id. at 712.
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C. Are There Equally Effective Alternatives to Proposition 16?
Assuming, arguendo, that the court found the NCAA's justification for Proposition
16 convincing, such a finding still would not have been decisive. Under the third prong
of Title VI disparate impact analysis, if a plaintiff submits an equally effective alterna-
tive practice that results in less disproportionality, the plaintiff will ultimately prevail.159
The Cureton plaintiffs presented three such alternative practices resulting in less ra-
cial disparity while still serving the NCAA's goal of raising student-athlete graduation
rates. 160 The NCAA's models accomplished this result either by enforcing a test cutoff
score, but lower than Proposition 16's, or eliminating the test score as a strict cutoff, but
retaining it as a "sliding scale" criteria to be used in conjunction with the student-
athlete's GPA. 16 ' The NCAA contested that the three models submitted do not predict
graduation rates equal to those projected under Proposition 16.162 Echoing its treatment
of Propositions 16's SAT score of 820, the court responded that it found nothing special
about its projected 61.8% graduation rate either. 163 Rather, the court held, to be "equally
effective" to Proposition 16, plaintiffs' models need only project graduation rates higher
than those experienced prior to the adoption of Proposition 16.164 Given that such rates
hovered around 56%, all three of plaintiffs' models sufficiently advanced plaintiffs'
articulated goal of raising graduation rates.' 65 And "[t]hat is all the proof that Plaintiffs
need[ed] to demonstrate under Title VI.'
166
Thus, having found that plaintiffs presented a prima facie case of disparate impact,
that the NCAA failed to respond with an educational justification for Proposition 16,
and finally, that plaintiffs proffered three equally effective, yet less discriminatory,
practices, the court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the merits of
their Title VI claim.'
67
V. Did Cureton Go Too Far--or Not Far Enough?
The plaintiffs' claim in Cureton presented the court with several threshold issues
that evoked largely unsettled points of law, at least in the Third Circuit. First, whether a
private right of action may be implied under Title VI's implementing regulations re-
mains an open question in light of the Supreme Court's Title VI jurisprudence. How-
ever, if Chester offers any indication, the Third Circuit will likely uphold Judge Buck-
walter's endorsement of plaintiffs' right of action. Second, whether the NCAA falls
160. Id. at 713.
161. Id. at113rlativ e  Overall Black Black
Student-Athlete Ineligibility False
Graduation Rate Rate Negatives*
Proposition 16 61.8% 19.4% 15.7%
Model 2 60.7% 15.9% 13.6%
Model 3 60.0% 15.7% 13.2%
Model 4 59.8% 15.6% 13.1%
*"False negatives" are students who are initially ineligible as a result of Proposition 16, but
who do eventually graduate.
See id. at 714.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. "Under Title VI, 'equally effective' means equivalent, comparable, or commensurate, rather than
identical." Id. at 713 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 294 (1985)).





within the ambit of Title VI is no less indeterminate. In finding that the NCAA is subject
to Title VI "irrespective of its receipt of federal funds,"'' 6 8 the court stretched the limits
of Title VI beyond what a plain reading of the statute can yield. Recalling, however, that
the court rested its conclusion on alternative and mutually exclusive theories, the Third
Circuit may adopt plaintiffs', more colorable "indirect recipient" theory or advance its
own theory in ruling that the NCAA is subject to Title VI. In any event, the court's
Promethean interpretation will be heavily scrutinized.
While Cureton may have gone too far in its findings on the preliminary matters, it is
submitted that, on the merits, the court may not have gone far enough. In enjoining the
NCAA from denying eligibility based on Proposition 16, the court unnecessarily limited
its ruling to illegalizing the use of the particular cutoff score of SAT 820.169 The court
did not preclude the use of any other cutoff score, and more significantly, it declined to
pass on the ultimate question before it - whether a standardized test should be used in
the eligibility equation at all.
The Cureton decision does not eliminate, but only temporarily ameliorates, the dis-
criminatory effects of the NCAA's eligibility rules. By leaving the door open for the
NCAA to simply adopt a more researched and less selective cutoff score, the deterrent
effect of the court's ruling is suspect. Ironically, Cureton's treatment of the issue,
though spotty, supports a wider ruling illegalizing any use of the SAT. At one point, the
court stated that "using a standardized test to achieve objectives for which it was neither
intended nor validated would be improper"; 70 later in the opinion, the court determined
that "the NCAA has not validated the use of the SAT . . . as a predictor of student-
athlete gradation rates"; 17 1 the court then confirmed that "[t]hese facts place into ques-
tion the validity of the use of the SAT or any particular cutoff in order to raise student-
athlete graduation rates at Division I schools when the SAT was not validated for that
purpose."' 172 Unfortunately, despite being "place[d] into question," it was never an-
swered.1
73
The plaintiffs' success at presenting a prima facie case of disparate impact coupled
with the NCAA's failure to justify any use of standardized tests - let alone a particular
cutoff score - for its of raising graduation rates mandatdd a broader conclusion than that
reached. Given that the average SAT score for African-American students remains about
200 points lower than those of white students, 174 seemingly any use of the SAT will
result in disparate impact. Under Title VI analysis, this disparate impact may be justified
by educational necessity. However, not only did the NCAA fail to show that the par-
ticular SAT score of 820 was justified, it could not show the use of any score was justi-
fied. This conclusion has, in addition to the plaintiffs, at least one unlikely supporter of
notable significance: the test administrators themselves. The President of the College
Board (administrators of the SAT), has stated the NCAA's use of the SAT is misguided:
Such use of the SAT in the process of selecting students for admission to college
would be contrary to the guidelines for test use published by the College Board ....
168. Id. at 696.
169. The court expressly declined to rule on the propriety of Proposition 16's GPA and course requirements
components. This ruling was appropriate considering the plaintiffs never challenged the legality of these
provisions. See id. at 716.
170. Id. at 707.
171. Id. at 708.
172. Id. (emphasis added).
173. Id.
174. See Kenneth L. Shropshire, Colorblind Propositions: Race, the SAT & the NCAA, 8 STAN. L. & PoL'Y
REv. 141, 145 (1997).
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[Tiest scores should never be used alone in determining admission to college. The
NCAA's action violates that principle .... In summary, under the NCAA rule, the
SAT would be used for a purpose which it was neither intended nor designed to
serve - determining athletic eligibility rather than college admissions; and ... the
way SAT scores are being used in establishing athletic eligibility is contrary to the
College Board's guidelines with respect to the use of test scores in making college
admissions decisions. 175
Thus, by only enjoining the NCAA from its continued operation of an eligibility cutoff
score of 820, and thereby inviting the NCAA to simply adopt a more researched, and
therefore "justified" cutoff, Cureton implicitly validates the use of the SAT. This results
in the inherent anomaly that notwithstanding its discriminatory effects and its undis-
puted lack of an empirical educational basis for its stated goal, standardized tests have
survived the Cureton decision.
Despite its limitations, Cureton remains a victory for African-American student-
athletes, and the civil rights community at large. By upholding the plaintiffs' disparate
impact claim, Cureton amplifies the heretofore unheard voices of African-American
student-athletes who have fallen victim to the NCAA's eligibility rules. In so doing,
Cureton delivers an unmistakable message to the NCAA that it is nb longer immune
from federal civil rights laws, and has to defend its eligibility rules on their merits.
TYLER J. MURRAY
175. See id. at 146 (quoting George Hanford, president of the College Board at the time of the
implementation of Proposition 48).
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